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The revisionist view of colonialism which seeks to portray colonialism in a 
positive light has now become once again fashionable. This is particularly true 
for countries which in recent years have been doing very well, countries in East, 
Southeast and South Asia such as China, South Korea, Indonesia and India. 
Surprisingly, the view that is now being argued is that the current success of 
this region is closely connected with the colonial experience. It is suggested that 
it is the colonial opening up, which created the conditions for the economic take 
off in these countries.  
 A peculiar argument has emerged which tries to claim the credit for the 
current success of this region to their colonial past. By a virtual sleight of hand, 
the two processes of globalisation, one under colonialism, between the 16th and 
the 19th centuries; and the other after the Second World War adopted by 
independent nation states are conflated. The fact that in the colonial period 
there was an enormous movement of labour and capital, and an enormous 
expansion of trade is being conflated with a similar expansion, in fact in some 
ways even a larger expansion, of trade and movement of capital that was 
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witnessed in the 20th century, especially since the 1960s. No mention, of course, 
is made of the fact that in the latter phase labour did not move as easily as it 
used to move in the early colonial phase or of the fact that the earlier process 
occurred under colonial hegemony for colonial purposes while the latter process 
was essentially mediated through independent nation states in a vastly changed 
global capitalist system.3  
 In this colonial understanding, the “bad” phase in the postcolonial 
countries like India was the nationalist, ‘protectionist’ phase which attempted 
to unstructure colonialism and promote national development. That is, in the 
Indian case, ‘the fly in the ointment’ was the Nehruvian phase. The “good” 
phases were the colonial period, when the colonial economies were opened up to 
the world, and again the open economy after the so-called ‘neo-liberal’ economic 
reforms in the second half of the 20th century.  
 This kind of position is found not only in the writings of Niall Ferguson, 
the very title of whose book ‘Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World’ 
sums up his basic conclusion that Britain made the modern world through the 
empire (FERGUSON, 2003). One finds such positions taken in the writings of 
Tirthankar Roy whose neo-colonial work published by Oxford University Press 
as the Economic History of India would in my opinion embarrass even the 
conservative British Viceroy Lord Curzon because of the blatant manner in 
which it argues the colonial paradigm (TIRTHANKAR, 2006). Similar 
positions are taken currently by economists like Lord Meghnad Desai, a former 
Marxist, who has moved considerably to the Right.  
 The basic position argued by these neo-colonialists is that colonialism 
had a positive impact on the colonies and that particularly the expansion of 
trade, creation of transport and communication infrastructure, etc., under 
colonialism were very beneficial for the colony and created positive initial 
conditions in the postcolonial situation. It is also argued that the early 
postcolonial phase which was relatively protectionist was what was wrong in 
the development of these societies. As Meghnad Desai put it “the first 40 years 
of India’s Independence (including the Nehruvian years) were wasted.” He also 
                                                 
3 For a brilliant analysis of the globalisation occurring post World War II, with world capitalism having 
reached a new phase, see Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994). 






argued that colonialism actually developed India and at independence left India 
among the top ten industrial countries of the world (DESAI, 2009)! I have in 
detail critiqued these colonial views elsewhere (MUKHERJEE, 2007; 2010).  
The Nehruvian effort at “unstructuring” colonialism and move in the 
direction of independent economic development was also critiqued, if not 
rubbished, by the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, based on a 
completely different set of assumptions. The orthodox Left, drawing its position 
from the 1928 VI Congress of the Comintern (Communist International), argues 
that no independent development is possible in not only the colonial situation 
but even after the colonial society has won political independence. It is argued 
that colonial economies and even postcolonial ‘peripheral’ economies necessarily 
developed in a manner that led to the further structuring in of dependence, 
making it impossible for them to break out of this dependent status unless these 
societies broke out of the capitalist path altogether and went over to socialism. 
This view was argued by Baul Baran in the 1950s, when a major spurt of 
decolonization was taking place and was taken up, somewhat understandably, 
by some of the dependency theorists in Latin America like Gunder Frank, as 
well by recent Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars like Samir Amin, Hamza Alavi. 
Given the a priori assumptions of this line of thinking India during Nehru’s 
leadership could not have developed independently as India had not gone 
socialist. In fact, the Communists immediately after independence declared that 
this independence was not ‘real’ and Nehru was ‘a running dog of imperialism’. 
However, this line of thinking, termed the CBF Model (Comintern-Baran-
Frank) by Bipan Chandra has been strongly critiqued in India from within the 
Left (CHANDRA, 2012) and it has been questioned elsewhere too (CARDOSO; 
FALETTO, 1979). I have done an extensive critique of this position elsewhere.4 
In this paper, I shall first, in brief, argue that the colonial legacy did 
not create positive “initial conditions” and that the path to development 
necessitated the ’unstructuring’ of colonialism. Second, I shall outline elements 
of the Nehruvian strategy for ‘unstructuring’ colonialism showing that the 
                                                 
4 See Aditya Mukherjee and Mridula Mukherjee, “Imperialism and the Growth of Indian Capitalism in 
the Twentieth Century”, Economic and Political Weekly, 12 March 1988; and Aditya Mukherjee, 
Imperialism, Nationalism and the Making of the Indian Capitalist Class (New Delhi: Sage, 2002). 
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Nehruvian period rather than being wasted or leading to further dependency 
actually promoted independent development and created the structural 
conditions for rapid development in later years. The Nehruvian strategy, which 
I call the ‘Nehruvian consensus’ at independence, was a product of a particular 
historical conjuncture. ‘Non-alignment’ was one aspect of this consensus. The 
historical conjuncture was constituted by a number of factors such as the legacy 
of colonialism or the “initial conditions” at the point of independence, the 
nature of world capitalism and the global balance of power at that time. 
 
Colonial Legacy 
A typical colonial economy often acquired features which though they appeared 
to be ‘modern’ or capitalist, they in reality performed completely different and 
distinctly colonial roles as they occurred within the colonial framework. For 
example, a colonial situation could witness, as it did in India, a high degree of 
commercialisation (or generalised commodity production), rapid growth in 
transport and communications, close integration with the world market and a 
high degree of ‘potential investible surplus’ raised from within the economy ─ 
all features associated with capitalist development. Yet in the colonial context 
all these developments led to capitalist development in the metropolis but 
further colonial structuring in the colony. It ended up, to use the early Indian 
nationalist, Tilak’s, expressive phrase, “decorating another’s wife”, while 
disfiguring one’s own. 
In the Indian colonial economy, which was forcibly internally 
disarticulated and extroverted, the above changes did not stimulate internal 
intersectoral exchanges between Indian agriculture and Indian industry, or 
between Indian consumer goods industry and capital goods industry.5 The 
circuit of commodity circulation was completed via the metropolis where 
colonial agriculture was linked to metropolitan industry, or colonial consumer 
goods industry (if and when it was allowed to develop) with metropolitan 
capital goods industry; the multiplier effects of these exchanges were thus 
transmitted abroad. Similarly, the surplus generated in the colonial economy 
                                                 
5 The question of exchange between the sector producing capital goods for the capital goods industry and 
the capital goods industry did not arise. 






did not lead to extended reproduction through investment (the key feature 
which distinguishes capitalism from pre-capitalist modes of production) thus 
raising the organic composition of capital and productivity to a higher level on 
a significant scale within the indigenous economy, but facilitated this process in 
the metropolis (MUKHERJEE, 2010; ALAVI, 1974). Traditional artisanal 
industry was destroyed (LUTSKY, 1969), (i.e., a process of de-industrialization 
occurred in a country which was the world’s largest exporter of textiles in the 
precolonial era) and not replaced with modern capital intensive industry on any 
significant scale. 
Capitalism did not grow in agriculture either. Commodity production in 
agriculture was in response to a “forced commercialisation” to primarily meet 
the colonial state’s revenue demands and not with a capitalist rationality, i.e., 
to earn profit for investment. Typically, agriculture witnessed a high degree of 
differentiation but it did not lead to capitalist farming through extended 
reproduction. The petty mode of production was perpetuated in agriculture 
with the large estates being let out to tenants with small holdings who 
continued to cultivate at more or less the same traditional levels of technology.6 
Moreover, agricultural output and exports, even when they grew,7 they 
remained articulated with metropolitan industrial and other needs. 
Colonialism has to be viewed and evaluated as an overall structure. 
Growth in one or the other sector of the colonial economy or society cannot be 
evaluated as ‘partial’ development (to be offset against the lack of such growth 
in another sector) if that sectorial growth was instrumental in creating the 
colonial structuring which led to overall stagnation and even decline. The 
                                                 
6 This tendency has been shown to be true even in areas like Punjab, in India, which has been wrongly 
claimed as moving in the direction of capitalist agriculture in Mridula Mukherjee, Colonialising 
Agriculture: The Myth of Punjab Exceptionalism (New Delhi: Sage, 2006). See also Aditya Mukherjee, 
"Agrarian Conditions in Assam 1880- 1890: A Case Study of Five Districts of the Brahmaputra Valley", 
The Indian Economic and Social History Review, Volume XVI, Number 2, Apr-June 1979, pp. 207-232, 
for a discussion on how colonial structuring of Indian agriculture occurs in a vastly different situation 
(from Punjab). 
7 In some instances, such as the sugar plantations of Indonesia in the late 19th century, they were 
operated by foreign capital at high levels of investment and technology, but yet they remained totally 
articulated to colonial needs and had no positive effect towards growth of capitalist agriculture in 
Indonesia. See, for example, Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change 
in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963); J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India (New 
York: 1944); and id., Colonial Policy and Practice (New York: New York University Press, 1956). 
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development of railways, foreign trade, telegraph, agrarian transformation, a 
colonial civil service, etc., occurred in a manner that they became critical 
instruments in converting the pre-capitalist and sometimes emerging capitalist 
societies8 into a stillborn colonial structure. The very instruments of the 
subversion of modern capitalist development in favour of colonial structuring 
cannot be treated as the ‘residual’ or ‘partial’ benefits of colonialism, a fallacy 
which unfortunately creeps into the thought of otherwise staunch liberal 
nationalists at the highest level and even some Marxists. 
The structural distortions created by colonialism made the future 
transition to self-sustained growth much more difficult. It required the 
overthrow of colonialism, and the ‘unstructuring’ of the colonial structure for 
India to start its attempt to build independent capitalism after colonialism for 
nearly two hundred years ravaged its economy and society and deprived it of 
the opportunity of participating in the process of modern industrial 
transformation occurring in other parts of the world. Despite certain positive 
developments in the Indian economy in certain areas,9 since W.W.I till 1947, 
India remained essentially backward and structurally colonial. The Indian 
economy at independence was still basically dependent on a stagnating, low 
productivity, ‘semi-feudal’ agriculture with modern industry (in 1950) 
contributing a mere 6 to 8 per cent of the national income and (in 1951) 
employing 2.3 per cent of the labour force (in 1946) (GOLDSMITH, 1983; 
CHANDRA, 1992). 
What India inherited after two hundred years of colonial ‘benevolence’, 
which allegedly gave India the ‘advantages’ of ‘commercialisation’, ‘exposure to 
the world market’, ‘transport and communication’, ‘a strong state’, ‘western 
scientific skills’, etc., benefits that Tirthankar Roy could hardly stop listing, 
was a very sorry state of affairs indeed. 
As Angus Maddison’s monumental work shows, India was the largest 
economy of the world for the entire thousand years of the first millennium 
accounting for close to 30 per cent of the world’s GDP. Till as late as the 
                                                 
8 For example, Mohammad Ali’s Egypt in the 1830s. 
9 I have shown elsewhere how even these positive developments were not the result of colonialism but 
were wrenched from it and occurred in spite of and in opposition to colonialism. See, for example, 
Imperialism, Nationalism and the Making of the Indian Capitalist Class (New Delhi: Sage, 2002), ch. 1. 






beginning of the 18th century India’s was still the largest economy with about 
25 per cent of the world’s GDP, more than eight times that of the United 
Kingdom. The decline started soon after and at the end of nearly two hundred 
years of colonial rule (during which Tirthankar Roy claims “colonial India 
experienced positive economic growth”) (TIRTHANKAR, 2006). India’s share 
had been reduced to a mere 4.2 per cent in 1950. A few decades were needed 
after independence before India could sufficiently shrug off the colonial legacy 
and begin to gradually claw her way back into improving her share of the global 
pie (MADDISON, 2007). This aspect we will deal with shortly. 
The impact of colonialism in human terms was traumatic and all too 
visible. At independence the average life expectancy was barely 30 years. The 
poor obviously died much younger. India was faced with acute food shortages 
creating near famine conditions repeatedly in different areas. The Bengal 
famine of 1943, just four years before the British left, claimed more than three 
million lives.10 Between 1946-53 about 14 million tons of food grains worth 
Rs.10,000 million had to be imported, seriously affecting India's planned 
development after independence. In 1951, 84 percent of the people (92 per cent 
women) were illiterate. 
It was from these abysmal initial conditions that Independent India 
under Nehru had to commence its journey towards modernization. An 
important element at the beginning of this journey was the setting up of the 
process of ’unstructuring’ the colonial structure so that the Indian economy and 
society was ready for take-off. We will outline below the contours of the 
strategy followed to unstructure colonialism. 
 
The Nehruvian Strategy 
Apart from the abysmal initial conditions an equally important element of the 
historical conjuncture that determined the course followed by independent 
                                                 
10 See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlements and Deprivation (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), Appendix D, pp.195-216, for a comprehensive exercise in estimation of famine 
deaths during the Bengal famine. While the Famine Inquiry Commission put it at 1.5 million, Sen 
convincingly argues why the figure is closer to around 3 million. See also Paul Greenough, Prosperity and 
Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 1943-44 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), where he 
argues a higher figure, and Rakesh Batabyal, Communalism in Bengal: From Famine to Noakhali, 1943-
47 (New Delhi: Sage, 2005). 
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India was the legacy of the movement, which led to the creation of the 
independent Indian state. Evidently, the nature of the newly born state is 
critically determined by the nature of the movement that leads to the creation 
of that state. The three basic elements of the Indian national liberation 
struggle, which created a deep impact on the Indian state at independence, were 
a commitment to anti-imperialism or sovereignty, commitment to a democratic 
civil libertarian framework (which inter alia meant creation of an inclusive, 
multicultural secular society) and the desire to maintain a pro-poor 
orientation.11 Particularly the first two, i.e., maintenance of sovereignty and 
democracy became two non-negotiables within which the Nehruvian Consensus 
had to function. This led to the Nehruvian attempt at industrial transformation 
with democracy, a unique attempt. In Nehru’s words a path “unique in 
history”.12 Never before in history was the process of transition to industrialism 
or the process of primitive accumulation accomplished along with democracy. 
The non-negotiable commitment to democracy meant that the 
necessary ‘surplus’ required for investment in order to facilitate the transition 
to industrialism could not be raised on the backs of the Indian working class 
and peasantry or on the basis of colonial surplus appropriation as happened in 
other countries in the past.13 
The commitment to sovereignty meant that the transition could not be 
accomplished with foreign aid or intervention in a manner that would make it a 
junior partner of any advanced country, however powerful it may be. The 
imperative of maintaining sovereignty was a natural pointer towards non-
alignment in the post-World War II Cold War situation where the world was 
divided into two power blocs. The policy of non-alignment in other words was 
                                                 
11 See my chapter “Political Economy of the Post Colonial Indian State” in Bipan Chandra, Mridula 
Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee, India Since Independence (New Delhi: Penguin, 2008), for a detailed 
discussion on the impact of the Indian National Movement on the postcolonial Indian state. 
12 Nehru was deeply conscious of this and often spoke about it. See, e.g., “Minutes of the fourth meeting 
of the National Development Council”, New Delhi, 6 May 1955, File Number 17(17&/56-PMS in Selected 
Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. 28, p.371). See also my introduction to Aditya 
Mukherjee (ed.), A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress, Volume V, 1964-84 (New Delhi: 
Academic Foundation, 2011). 
13 See Aditya Mukherjee, “Empire: How Colonial India made Modern Britain”, Economic and Political 
Weekly, Volume XLV, No 50, 11 December 2010, for a detailed discussion of how colonial surplus 
appropriation aided the process of primitive accumulation in the West. 
 






as much a function of the strategy of economic development chosen by India, as 
it was a product of the Indian national movement’s commitment to world peace 
and sovereignty of nation states. 
Nehru and the early Indian planners had correctly understood that 
political independence was of little value if it could not be used to acquire first 
economic and then intellectual independence. At independence, because of the 
nature of colonialism it was subjected to, India was virtually totally dependent 
on the advanced world for capital goods and technology for making any 
investment. India then produced virtually no capital goods. In 1950, India met 
nearly 90 per cent of its needs of even machine tools, leave alone machines, 
through imports. This meant that though India was politically independent it 
was completely dependent on the advanced countries for achieving any 
economic growth though investment. 
This was a neo-colonial type situation, which needed immediate 
remedy. And this is the situation that the famous Nehru-Mahalonobis strategy 
tried to reverse by adopting a heavy industry or capital goods industry based 
industrialisation. During the first three plans (1951-65) industry in India grew 
at 7.1 per cent per annum. This was a far cry from the deindustrialisation 
process of the 19th century and the slow industrial growth between 1914-47. 
More important “the three-fold increase in aggregate index of industrial 
production between 1951 and 1969 was the result of a 70 per cent increase in 
consumer goods industries, a quadrupling of the intermediate goods production 
and a ten-fold increase in the output of capital goods” (VAIDYANATHAN, 
1983). This pattern of industrial development led to a structural transformation 
of the colonial legacy. From a situation where to make any capital investment, 
virtually the entire equipment had to be imported the share of imported 
equipment in the total fixed investment in the form of equipment in India had 
come down to 43 per cent in 1960 and a mere 9 per cent in 1974, whereas the 
value of the fixed investment in India increased by about two and a half times 
over this period (1960-74).14 
                                                 
14 See Aditya Mukherjee, “Planned Development in India 1947-65: The Nehruvian Legacy” in Shigeru 
Akita (ed.), South Asia in the 20th Century International Relations (Tokyo: Institute of Oriental 
Culture, the University of Tokyo, 2000), and also in Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya 
Mukherjee, India Since Independence, op. cit., ch.25. These paragraph’s figures are from an extremely 
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This was a major achievement and, as it considerably increased India's 
autonomy from the advanced countries in determining her own rate of capital 
accumulation or growth, it created the key condition for non-alignment or 
relative independence from both the power blocs. In my understanding no 
amount of diplomatic finesse could achieve and sustain the objective of non-
alignment without the economic basis of relative autonomy having been 
created. 
The heavy industry based industrialisation had to be achieved without 
losing India’s independence as after all the whole purpose of the following this 
path was to achieve such an independence. As India at independence did not 
have a sufficiently large indigenous private enterprise to take on the massive 
task of developing capital goods industries the only other option was to develop 
it through the public sector. The option of basing the development of this sector 
on foreign capital did not arise as the Nehruvian consensus was that sovereignty 
would be achieved only if its industrial development was primarily built 
indigenously and was not based on foreign capital. The public sector was clearly 
seen as the alternative to foreign capital domination and not necessarily as an 
alternative to the private enterprise if it was available (MUKHRJEE, 2002). 
India adopted the path of a mixed economy where a large public sector 
would exist in partnership with the private sector. They would be 
complimentary and not in contradiction with each other (MUKHRJEE, 1974). 
The United States, with its virtual paranoia about socialism was unwilling to 
help India follow this path of independent industrialisation based on a 
nationalised or public sector. The US insistence on the private sector and its 
own favoured model of development pushed India towards the Soviet Union. 
But then sovereignty and non-alignment meant that India would not be client 
state or junior partner to any of the super powers. When the US stance pushed 
India too hard in one direction India sought Soviet help to remain non-aligned 
and follow an economic path of her own choice. Soviet help did not mean that 
India accepted the economic framework favoured by them. Indian planning 
borrowed many elements of the Soviet model but was critically different in two 
                                                                                                                      
persuasive piece by Vijay Kelkar, “India and the World Economy: A Search for Self Reliance”, Paper 
read at Seminar on Jawaharlal Nehru and Planned Development, New Delhi, 1980, and reprinted in 
Economic and Political Weekly, Volume 15, Numbers 5-7, February 1980. 






aspects. First, it created a system where private enterprise could grow in 
tandem with the public sector rather than a system which would abolish it 
altogether. Second, planning in India was to be consensual and not a command 
performance. I.e., every aspect of the planning strategy had to be acceptable to 
different sections of Indian people in a democratic manner. 
Apart from increase in public expenditure the other way of reducing 
foreign dependence for achieving internal growth was to increase domestic 
savings and capital formation. Here too the years after independence saw a 
structural breakthrough. The last half a century of century of colonial rule 
(1901-1946) saw the gross capital formation in the Indian economy hover 
around 6 to 7 per cent of GDP (GOLDSMITH, 1983). The net capital formation 
during this period was perhaps nil or even negative as the drain or the unilateral 
transfer of Indian ‘potential investible surplus’ to Britain has been variously 
calculated to be between 5 to 10 per cent of her GDP (HABIB, 1995; HABIB, 
1975; PATNAIK, 2000; CHANDRA, 2008). The first fifty years after 
independence on the other hand saw the annual rate of capital formation rise 
consistently sharply from about 9 per cent in 1950-55 to about five times the 
colonial rate (assuming there was no drain) in 2005-6, a whopping 33.8 per cent 
(ECONOMIC SURVEY, 2007).15 
While reducing dependence on foreign capital and technology for 
making indigenous investment was one way of gaining and keeping the 
country’s sovereignty intact there were other strategies adopted as well. India 
undertook a deliberate strategy of diversifying its foreign trade so that her 
dependence on any one country or bloc of countries was reduced. As a result the 
geographical concentration index (GCI) of trade with foreign countries declined 
sharply. GCI of India’s exports declined from 0.69 in 1947 to 0.22 in 1975. There 
was a similar decline in GCI in case of imports. Significantly, the result of the 
declining GCI was that the share of the metropolitan countries of the West, 
which earlier dominated India’s trade, declined sharply. For example, the share 
of UK and USA in India’s exports, which was 45 per cent, in 1947 fell by more 
than half and by 1977 it was only 20 per cent (KELKAR, 1980). This was 
                                                 
15 Computed from Economic Survey 2006-07 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2007), Tables 1.4, 1.5, S-
6 to S-9. 
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partly achieved by the increase in India’s trade with the Socialist bloc (which 
bailed out an extremely foreign exchange short India by allowing barter and 
Rupee trade) and other under developed countries. 
The diversification was to keep dependence on any one country or bloc 
of countries low. The shift away from the UK and USA was however, not to 
lead to becoming a Soviet ‘stooge’. That would defeat the whole point of non-
alignment. 
Care was taken to keep a similar attitude in the area of military 
dependence as well. India did move considerably towards the Soviet Union for 
its military requirement partly to offset its earlier virtual total dependence on 
the West in this area and partly because the Soviets offered better terms 
including a much higher degree of indigenization of defense equipment bought. 
Yet India avoided a total dependence on the Soviet Union either. If MIGs were 
bought so were Jaguars. 
Moreover, while dependence on any one country or bloc of countries 
was sought to be kept low and decreasing, in the early decades after 
independence, the overall dependence on the outside world was also kept low. 
Total foreign trade (exports and imports) as a proportion of GDP remained low 
through the 1950s to 1970s, hovering around 10 per cent (it rose to over 30 per 
cent in the new millennium as a result of the economic reforms which 
accelerated since 1991). Dependence on foreign aid was also kept low and 
brought down sharply. Net aid as percentage of India’s Net National Product 
declined from 3.88 per cent in the 2nd Plan to between 0.5 and 1.8 per cent in the 
1970s (KELKAR, 1980). 
Another area of concern for the maintenance of India’s sovereignty and 
ability to stay non-aligned was India’s food security. This was learnt at great 
cost by India in the mid-1960s when massive food shortages made India greatly 
dependent on the United States for supply of foodgrains under the Pl 480 
scheme. This was a dependence which the United States used to keep India on a 
“tight leash” to use President Lyndon Johnson’s shocking phrase. India was 
forced to experience what has been called a ‘ship-to-mouth’ existence and was 
arm-twisted into adopting economic policy measures asked for by the US 
(MUKHERJEE, 2011). 
The quest for self-sufficiency in food was now pushed with greater 
urgency adopting what has been called the Green Revolution strategy. It 






produced dramatic results. The legacy of colonialism was such that at the end of 
colonial rule, per capita agricultural output actually fell at an annual rate of 
0.72 per cent between 1911 and 1941 and food crop output fell even more 
sharply by 1.14 per cent per year over the same period. Food grain yields per 
acre were declining at 0.44 per cent between 1921 and 1946 (BLYN, 1966). No 
wonder at independence India was faced with chronic food shortages and 
famine conditions. This situation was getting reversed with Indian agriculture 
in the first three plans (up to 1964) growing at over 3 per cent per annum, eight 
times faster than in the half century preceding independence (1891-1946) 
(BLYN, 1966). Moreover, areas like Punjab were showing massive increases in 
yields with the value productivity of 11 major crops increasing by 12.5 per cent 
per year between 1950 and 1970 (MUKHERJEE, 2006). The combination of 
the land reforms and the investments in infrastructure – like irrigation, 
electricity, etc. –, initiated by Nehru, and the Green Revolution strategy 
implemented after him led to a structural break in Indian agriculture. As a 
result, the net imports of foodgrains declined from over ten million tons in 1966 
to less than half a million ton in 1977. By the 1980s India was self-sufficient in 
food with buffer stocks exceeding 30 million tons.16 
Last but certainly not the least Jawaharlal Nehru and the early Indian 
planners were acutely aware of India's backwardness and near total dependence 
on the advanced world in science and technology (an area left consciously 
barren in the colonial period) and therefore made massive efforts to overcome 
this shortcoming. Almost every known scientific institution in India was 
conceived in the Nehruvian period be it the IITs, the (BARC) Bhabha Atomic 
Research Centre, the National Physical Laboratory, the National Chemical 
Laboratory, the Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and 
numerous such others. An unprecedented increase occurred in the educational 
opportunities in science and technology in the universities and institutes. 
National expenditure on scientific research and development kept growing 
rapidly with each plan. For example, it increased from Rs. 10 million in 1949 to 
Rs. 4.5 billion in 1977. Over roughly the same period the stock of India's 
                                                 
16 See Aditya Mukherjee, “Agricultural Growth and the Green Revolution” in Bipan Chandra, Mridula 
Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee, India Since Independence, op. cit. 
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scientific and technical manpower increased more than 12 times from 190 
thousand to 2.32 million spectacular growth by any standards. It is Jawaharlal 
Nehru’s brilliant and precocious anticipation of the move towards a ‘knowledge 
society’ in world capitalism and his huge emphasis in this area from the first 
plan itself, which has enabled post economic reform India to reap the benefits of 




In sum then, it is the reversal of the colonial structuring by creating a 
diversified industrialisation leading to considerable self-reliance for promoting 
growth, a dynamic growing agriculture creating food security, higher rates of 
domestic capital formation, greatly improved scientific and technical 
capabilities reducing foreign dependence on capital and technology which 
enabled India to chart out an independent foreign policy, relatively 
independent of both the power blocs in the Cold War period. It enabled India, 
still a very poor country to play a leading part in the Non-Aligned Movement, a 
movement which was seen with great suspicion particularly by the US-led bloc. 
It explains Indira Gandhi’s ability to withstand US efforts at playing big 
brother at India’s most vulnerable moments. 
Nehru with his personal international prestige and the prestige of the 
Indian national liberation struggle (which transformed the colonial world) 
behind him was in the initial years after independence able to pursue an 
independent foreign policy even before the process of colonial unstructuring had 
begun to bear fruit fully. However, such a stance was not sustainable in the 
long run without the Indian economy acquiring a relative autonomy. This was 
particularly so after Nehru passed away and the glow of the national liberation 
struggle began to wane. 
The Nehruvian years far from being the ‘wasted years’ laid the 
foundations of building a sovereign democratic country by ‘unstructuring’ the 
colonial structure imposed on India. Without this foundation the Indian 
economy was not ready for an economic ‘take off’ as a sovereign nation. It was 
this foundation, which enabled the Indian economy to participate in 
globalisation process without compromising its sovereignty and with great 
advantage to itself, achieving an unprecedented growth trajectory. It is not an 






accident that both the former colonies or semi-colonies like India and China 
which had faced massive colonial exploitation and had been brought to their 
knees during the colonial period needed a few decades of colonial ‘unstructuring’ 
before they could once again open up to the world and achieve impressive 
indigenous development. 
The Nehru years may have achieved slow growth, though compared to 
the colonial period they were quite impressive. The growth of per capita income 
in India in the colonial period was either zero or very low, remaining way below 
that of the independent countries of Europe, USA and Japan between 1820 and 
1913. In the last decades of colonial rule, after colonialism had had its full 
impact, the per capita income in India actually declined at an annual rate of -
0.22 per cent between 1913-1950. After independence, on the other hand, it 
grew at 1.4 per cent in the first couple of decades between 1950-1973. This was 
about 3 times faster than the best phase (1870-1913) under colonialism 
(MADDISON, 2007). 
However, it is after the initial Nehruvian decades after independence 
that the growth rates shoot up, especially after the adoption of economic 
reforms and the greater participation in the globalization process. Between 
1973-2001 the per capita income grew at an annual rate of 3.01 per cent, (a rate 
considerably higher than that achieved by West Europe, USA or Japan) 17 and 
in the four years (2003-4 to 2006-7) at an astounding 7 per cent (it was over 8 
per cent in 2006-7) comparable to the explosive rates achieved by Japan 
(though in very special circumstances) between 1950-73.18 Two points need to 
be noted about these high growth rates, First, that they were a product of the 
foundation laid in the Nehruvian period. Second, these growth rates could be 
achieved without compromising India’s sovereignty or the choice of her path of 
                                                 
17 West Europe as a whole grew at 1.88 per cent between 1973 and 2001. Maddison, ibid., p. 643. 
18 Figures for 2001-2007 are based on Economic Survey 2006-07 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2007), 
Tables 1.2, S-4; and Aditya Mukherjee, “Indian Economy in the New Millennium”, in Bipan Chandra, 
Mridula Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee, India Since Independence, (New Delhi: Penguin, 2008). I 
have taken the per capita income growth rate for 2006-2007 at a conservative 8 per cent. S. 
Sivasubramonian’s comprehensive and detailed study confirms the sharp break in aggregate growth rates 
as well as in different sectors of the economy between 1900-1947 and 1947-2000. See, e.g., S. 
Sivasubramonian, The National Income of India in the Twentieth Century (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), Table 9.35, Fig. 9.5, pp. 622-628. 
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democracy, again because of the foundations laid in the Nehruvian period. 
Quite contrary to the argument of the orthodox Left post-economic 
reform India has not surrendered her sovereignty to neo-colonial imperialist 
forces or the so-called ‘Washington consensus’. Far from the Indian economy 
becoming more ‘dependent’ since the reforms it has considerably improved its 
bargaining power with external world. While certainly there has occurred a 
greater integration with the external world it has not occurred at the cost of 
India losing its sovereignty (MUKHERJEE , 2008).  While non-alignment can 
no longer take the same form as it did during the Cold War period, with the 
emergence of the so called unipolar world, Indian economic strategy and foreign 
policy retains the spirit and essence of non-alignment and has refused to get 
drawn into a junior partner relationship with any country or bloc of countries. 
India’s participation in South-South cooperation, IBSA, BRICS and increasing 
interest in the ASEAN as well as the look East policy all appear to be under the 
rubric of non-alignment and opposition to big power hegemonic dominance. 
One may add in the end that the commitment to ‘democracy’, the other 
imperative apart from the quest for sovereignty, which was bequeathed to 
Indian people as the legacy of her national liberation struggle, and which Nehru 
carefully nurtured, was very important in the maintenance of India’s 
independent position. It is easier to dominate a country ruled by ‘tin-pot’ 
dictators than a functioning democracy. India would not be easy to push 
around even if there were certain governments which were weak or ideologically 




To sum up then, the Nehruvian years succeeded in making a paradigmatic 
break from the colonial past and created the conditions for India entering the 
economic modernization process. This is quite contrary to the argument of neo-
liberal enthusiasts and neo-colonialists who demonise the Nehru years, seeing 
them as the “wasted years” after independence with true development 
occurring in the colonial period and again only since the economic reforms and 
India opening up to the global economy (DESAI, 2009; TIRTHANKAR, 2006). 
It is the structural breaks that the Nehruvian period made in several areas such 
as creating a diversified industrial capacity, a scientific and technical 






educational infrastructure land reforms, and agricultural transformation that 
laid the foundation for the subsequent developments. India’s developmental 
breakthrough since the economic reforms was not despite the Nehruvian phase 
but was made possible because of it. 
It is equally wrong to demonise the shift to economic reforms involving 
a certain liberalization and participation in the globalisation process and seeing 
it as a sell out to imperialism or as an eminent economist of the Left put it as 
the nation state now being “dictated by the caprices of a bunch of international 
rentiers” (PATNAIK, 1998; 2003). 
The broad consensus that has emerged in India in recent years, 
however, does not take such a dim view of the reforms. The commonly 
perceived need for a shift away from the excessively dirigiste, inward looking 
and protectionist strategy, which was leading to a dangerous fall in efficiency 
and productivity levels and the urge to participate in the globalisation process 
in the altered circumstances of world capitalism in recent decades, where major 
possibilities had emerged of utilising global capital and global markets for 
indigenous development, has led to the emergence of a broad consensus in 
favour of reform. This was a consensus reminiscent of the earlier Nehruvian 
consensus both in terms of the objectives and width of support. The desire to 
achieve the same goals set out at independence — of self-reliance, rapid growth 
and removal of poverty —and not their abandonment, now drew support for 
reform and the adoption of the new strategy. 
The fact that India was able to demonstratively profit by participating 
in the globalisation process, including by opening its doors considerably to flows 
of foreign goods, services and capital, without being overwhelmed by it, and 
that China had continued to follow this path with greater enthusiasm and with 
remarkable success, further cemented the consensus around the need for change 
in the direction of economic reform that had emerged in India by 1991. It is no 
accident that so many of the very people who created, outlined or subscribed to 
the earlier Nehruvian strategy over time saw the necessity of reform. We have 
had, for example, apart from Indira Gandhi herself, the radical economist of the 
Nehruvian era K.N. Raj, the Marxist economist Lord Meghnad Desai, the 
Nehruvian Narasimha Rao, Left economists Late Sukhamoy Chakravarty, C.H. 
Hanumantha Rao, Arjun Sengupta and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, and 
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practicing Communist and Chief Minister of West Bengal for the longest tenure 
since independence, Jyoti Basu, his successor in the Communist led West 
Bengal Government, Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya – all 
implementing or arguing for economic reform involving liberalisation and 
participation in the globalisation process, though with different approaches and 
in varying degrees. Even the BJP despite the strong resistance of the RSS 
supported Swadeshi Jagaran Manch, is essentially committed to pressing on 
with reforms.  
In this context, it is very instructive to see the position adopted by the 
former Left Dependency thinker F. H. Cardoso, who as President of Brazil 
guided the country through economic reform and participation in the 
globalisation process. He made a major shift from his earlier position and 
pointed out how the nature of foreign capital had changed and could be used for 
indigenous development of underdeveloped countries. He argued that 
globalisation was a fact that could not be ignored, and thus the relevant point 
of debate is not whether to globalise but how to globalise so that a better 
bargain be achieved for the backward countries and a proper cushion be 
provided to the poor so that they are not made to bear the cost of the initial 
transition. This is a view which the supporters of reform from the Left in India 
as well as the more sagacious business leaders have generally accepted. Very 
significantly, Cardoso emphasised that popular mobilisation and community 
work would be necessary to ensure that that the poor were fully protected. He 
added that the democratic space in India and the tradition of resistance from 
the time of Mahatma Gandhi gave India a clear advantage over many other 
underdeveloped countries (verbal information) (CARDOSO, 1996). 
In fact, the recent popular mobilisations in India, leading to progressive 
legislations by the UPA government after it came to power in 2004, like the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and Right to Information Act are 
significant initiatives in the direction of deepening India’s democracy and 
empowering the poor and underprivileged so that the chief challenge facing 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I shall argue, in brief, that the colonial legacy did not create 
positive “initial conditions” and that the path to development necessitated the 
’unstructuring’ of colonialism. Second, I shall outline elements of the Nehruvian 
strategy for ‘unstructuring’ colonialism showing that the Nehruvian period rather than 
being wasted or leading to further dependency actually promoted independent 
development and created the structural conditions for rapid development in later years. 
The Nehruvian strategy, which I call the ‘Nehruvian consensus’ at independence, was a 
product of a particular historical conjuncture. ‘Non-alignment’ was one aspect of this 
consensus. The historical conjuncture was constituted by a number of factors such as the 
legacy of colonialism or the “initial conditions” at the point of independence, the nature 
of world capitalism and the global balance of power at that time. 
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